Tag: peter baker
Republicans Can’t Be Trusted To Hold Their Own President Accountable

Republicans Can’t Be Trusted To Hold Their Own President Accountable

What message should the American public take from Donald Trump’s imminent acquittal by the Republican-majority Senate?

Our nation’s top political journalists are going to great lengths to avoid the obvious but very partisan-sounding answer to that question.

So we have Philip Rucker writing in the Washington Post that it will have “profound and long-term ramifications for America’s institutions and the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, according to numerous historians and legal experts.”

We have Peter Baker writing in the New York Times that Democrats took their shot, and failed:

With the end of the impeachment trial now in sight and acquittal assured, a triumphant Mr. Trump emerges from the biggest test of his presidency emboldened, ready to claim exoneration and take his case of grievance, persecution and resentment to the campaign trail.

Baker adds that impeachment will be a “stain” on Trump’s record, but according to the polls, it’s a wash.

Julie Pace, writing for the Associated Press, comes considerably closer to the real takeaway. Her first sentence:

Republicans have decided it was OK.

But she distances herself from the obvious conclusion, attributing it to others:

To Democrats, who initiated the impeachment process in hopes of pulling at least a handful of moderate or retiring GOP lawmakers to their side, Republicans are sending the message that, when it comes to Trump, nothing matters. His grip on the party is complete.

Here’s what these reporters should have said, but couldn’t, because it just sounds too much like they’re taking sides.

The big takeaway from Trump’s impeachment is that he incontrovertibly abused his office and engaged in a coverup.

The bit takeaway from Trump’s acquittal is that Republicans cannot be trusted to hold members of their own party accountable.

The Constitution hasn’t changed, and the Constitutional limits to the executive branch will be no different on Thursday than they were 10 years ago – except when Republicans control the Senate.

Princeton historian Julian Zelizer tweeted:

But instead, reporters like Rucker try their damnedest to bury the lede.

So, after declaiming the “profound and long-term ramifications,” Rucker explained that what the historians mean, more specifically, is that “the Senate is lowering the bar for permissible conduct for future presidents.”

That’s right, “the Senate.”

There are a lot of quotes from Jon Meacham. Here’s a paragraph high up in Rucker’s story.

“It’s a dispiriting moment for an American system that in many ways was founded on the insight that, because humankind is frail and fallen and fallible, no one branch of government can have too much power,” said Jon Meacham, an American historian and author. “The president’s party, instead of being a check on an individual’s impulses and ambitions, has become an instrument of them.”

It’s only if you read all the way to the bottom that Rucker quotes Meacham really getting to the point, which is that it’s not a failure of humankind, or constitutional checks and balances, or Congress, or even the Senate. It’s specifically a failure of the Republican Party.

“It is not hyperbolic to say that the Republican Party treats Donald Trump more like a king than a president,” Meacham said. “That was a central and consuming anxiety of the framers. It is a remarkable thing to watch the party of Lincoln and Eisenhower and Reagan and the Bushes become an instrument of Donald Trump’s. That’s a massive historical story.”

I must admit, by the way, that Rucker’s first sentence made me laugh out loud. He wrote:

The evidence of President Trump’s actions to pressure Ukraine was never in serious dispute.

Now, I happen to agree that the evidence was incontrovertible, and that those arguing otherwise should not have been taken seriously by any right-minded journalist.

But that’s not the way Rucker’s paper has described the argument in the past — and not even the way his paper was describing it in an accompanying piece in the same edition. Felicia Sonmez may be the hero of last week’s Washington Post twitter drama, but she and Rachael Bade — in their article about the smorgasbord of sometimes conflicting excuses Republican senators are making for their decision to willfully blind themselves and bend the knee – couldn’t bring themselves to say anything more definitive than:

The crux of the impeachment case against Trump is whether he used $391 million in military aid and a coveted White House meeting for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as leverage to force the foreign leader to conduct political investigations, including one focused on Joe Biden.

There’s no “whether” here.

If the Post actually embraced Rucker’s conclusion that there is no real dispute – and I wish they would! — then every time they quote some partisan claiming that the president is being persecuted, or that the impeachment was purely political, there ought to be a sentence or two pointing out, for the record, how wrong they are.

Weekend Reader: <i>Days Of Fire: Bush And Cheney In The White House</i>

Weekend Reader: Days Of Fire: Bush And Cheney In The White House

Today the Weekend Reader brings you Days Of Fire: Bush And Cheney In The White Houseby Peter Baker, who covered the White House for The Washington Post during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies, and now serves as Chief White House Correspondent for The New York Times. The excerpt below details how President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney made tough decisions on the deteriorating situation in Iraq. At a point when Americans were losing faith in winning the war, Bush and Cheney had no qualms carrying out any and all actions necessary — regardless of whether a majority of  Americans agreed or not.

You can purchase the book here.

Bush understood that bailing out a Wall Street bank would not be popular, and a part of him was chagrined at that. Not Cheney. As the two of them progressed through their last year in office, their public standing had sunk so low that it had become almost like a badge of honor: what they were doing must be about principle, since it sure was not a political winner.

But there was a fine line between ignoring the fickle winds of popularity and losing the consent of the governed. Cheney skated near that line with defiance. On March 19, the fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq War, he traveled to the region to highlight the progress of the surge. During a stop in Oman, he gave an interview to Martha Raddatz of ABC News.

“Two-thirds of Americans say it’s not worth the fighting,” she told him. “So? ” Cheney answered.

Raddatz seemed taken aback.

“So? ” she said. “You don’t care what the American people think? ”

“No,” he said, “I think you cannot be blown off course by the fluctuations in the public opinion polls.”

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The polls actually were not fluctuating; they were heading in one inexorable direction. Even with the evident success of the surge, Bush and Cheney had lost the American public on Iraq. As Cheney saw it, popular opinion should not stop them from doing what was needed  to protect  the country. “He believed that losing these wars was the worst possible outcome for the United States,” said John Hannah, his national security adviser. “He was convinced that we had to win, and you got the sense that he wouldn’t be swayed by bad polls or a lack of public support.” As Liz Cheney put it, “Everything else was less important,  and if it meant  your reputation  was damaged, that was what you had to live with.”

A few days later, the situation in Iraq took a dramatic turn. Shiite militias had fled to the port city of Basra in the southeast near the Iranian border, the hub of the country’s oil industry. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had received reports  of women being beaten  for failing to properly cover up and even mutilated if accused of sexual indiscretions. In a brash move, Maliki ordered the Iraqi army south to take on the militias, only informing David Petraeus after the decision had been made. Petraeus was stunned at the recklessness; without any preparation, there was no way for American forces to support such an operation. “It was very, very precipitous and arguably bordering on impulsive,” Petraeus  concluded. But Maliki disregarded Petraeus’s advice, even traveling to Basra personally to oversee the operation. The American fears were well-founded; Iraqi units were ill-prepared and ran out of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, and in some cases soldiers refused to fight fellow Shiites. Petraeus ordered Special Forces, Apache helicopters, and Predator drones to follow the prime minister and give him support, but with so little coordination “we couldn’t figure out who were the good guys and who were the bad guys.”

At the White House, the national security team was in a panic. Condoleezza Rice called Bush to tell him Maliki’s government could fall. The CIA offered a grim prognosis. “Everybody here thought this was going to be a disaster,” recalled Douglas Lute, the Iraq War coordinator. Lute thought Maliki had gambled everything. “If he doesn’t get killed, he’s going to cripple himself politically because he’s going to be shown as unable to deliver.”

But Bush did not see it that way. “Don’t tell me this is a bad thing,” he said, preempting  Stephen Hadley and Brett McGurk when they arrived at the Oval Office to brief him. “Maliki said he would do this and now he’s doing it.”

For the first time, the Shiite prime minister was taking on Shiite militias as the Americans had asked him to do. Bush believed Maliki, however rashly, was finally showing leadership. While he did not say it out loud, there may have been a part of the old Texan who appreciated  the cowboy nature of the move; Maliki was following his gut with bold action, just as Bush believed he did.

When he sat down for a videoconference with Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker on March 24, Bush stood alone in his assessment.

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“This has some potential to be dicey here,” Petraeus  said with understatement.  While the Americans would of course provide support, he told Bush, “you’ve got to understand  there are some serious risks involved here.” Bush said he understood the risks but saw the development as a breakthrough, not a debacle. They had to trust Maliki. “We have wanted him to step up and lead,” he said. “Our job here is to support  him, not to try to convince him not to do it.” They had to make sure Maliki succeeded. “This is going to be a decisive moment.”

His team on the ground was not so optimistic. In Baghdad, Crocker, a Bush favorite whose glass-half-empty reports had earned  him the presidential nickname Sunshine, turned  off the microphone so he could not be heard back in Washington. “I hope it’s going to be decisive the way he hopes it will,” he told Petraeus.

It very nearly was not. Maliki’s headquarters was shelled and his personal bodyguard and childhood friend was killed in the bombardment. Shia militias in Baghdad likewise responded with force, peppering Crocker’s palace headquarters in the Green  Zone with rockets, nearly a hundred in a forty-eight-hour stretch. But in the end, Petraeus  scrambled enough force and Maliki showed enough  fortitude  that  the  militias backed off. Maliki reasserted government control over Basra. Suddenly what looked like a breaking point became the moment he finally became a national leader. “He came back from Basra a different Maliki,” Lute observed. Senator Lindsey Graham, who talked about it with Maliki afterward, agreed that the Iraqi prime minister was a “changed man” who “went from being docile to being John Wayne.”

If you enjoyed this excerpt, purchase the full book here.

From the book Days of Fire by Peter Baker. Copyright © 2013 by Peter Baker. Reprinted by arrangement with Doubleday, an imprint of The Knopf Doubleday Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC