This weekend, The Weekend Reader brings you Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’ recently released titleÂ In Spies We Trust: The Story Of Western Intelligence. There is no shortage of criticism for the intelligence community following whistleblower/traitor Edward Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s PRISM program. In Spies We Trust adds another critical, yet powerful voice to this debate between perceived privacy violations and security.Â Jeffreys-Jones, Emeritus Professor of American History at the University of Edinburgh and expert on intelligence history, skillfully outlines the history of the U.S.-U.K. intelligence relationship and where this relationship has taken us today.Â
You can purchase the bookÂ here.
Valerie Plame had already operated under diplomatic cover in Athens. When she arrived in Belgium, she exchanged that relatively comfortable arrangement for more adventurous types of cover — as a student and later as a business executive in Brussels she had fewer restrictions, and got to know a wider variety of useful people with more interesting information to divulge. But should her cover ever be blown, she was also open to retaliation from America’s adversaries.
The retaliation, however, would not come from her country’s enemies. We now cut to the time when Plame had re-located to Washington. From 2002, she worked there for the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control Center. It was in connection with this work that she found herself at the centre of a shameful Anglo-American intelligence scandal.
Her story became an illustration of a failure in efficacy, and of the wresting of intelligence away from the professionals to the politicians, making the value of intelligence zero.
When the Bush administration opted for military means to achieve regime change in Iraq, it decided that the best way of drumming up support for the policy was to convince the American public that Iraqâs dictator, Saddam Hussein, was producing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Plame recalls that in early 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney made frequent and unprecedented visits to the CIA to try to persuade the agency to produce persuasive evidence of Saddamâs intentions.
By this time, Plame had married a career diplomat, Joseph Wilson, who in common with her had expertise in non-proliferation investigations and had spent some time in the African country, Niger. When rumors came through that Saddam was buying from Niger a supply of uranium âyellowcakeâ that might help him produce nuclear weapons, Plame suggested that Wilson be sent to Niger to ï¬nd out. Perhaps there is evidence to suggest that she had by this time already shown signs of wobbling, having âgone nativeâ in Europe and become disillusioned with her CIA career, but there is nothing to suggest that Wilsonâs evidence was in any way skewed when on the basis of his Niger investigation he reported that the yellowcake story was in all probability an unfounded rumor.
Both British and American intelligence officials concluded by SeptemberÂ 2002 that other rumors were also untrue, for example the one that Iraq would be able to assemble WMDs within 45 minutes. Britainâs Joint Intelligence Committee chairman John Scarlett speciï¬cally rejected the charge that Iraq had purchased aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment purposes. But all this was sub rosa and, anxious to please the Americans, the Tony Blair government proceeded to âsex upâ the evidence to suggest that Saddam was plotting WMDs. News of the deception leaked to the BBC, but not in a conclusive manner.
In his State of the Union address in January 2003, President Bush citedÂ British sources for his statement that yellowcake was going to Iraq, and made the WMD allegation the basis of his case for war. Blair issued supportive statements. The Anglo-American attack on Iraq started in March.
In July, Joe Wilson published an op-ed in the New York Times saying, âwe went to war on false pretencesâ. Â A furious Bush administration immediately exacted revenge on him by outing Valerie Plame as a CIA official via a leak to the Washington Post, thus destroying her career and potentially placing her life in danger. A few days after that, the body of Dr David Kelly was found in English woodland. A Ministry of Defence adviser on biological weapons, he had been ï¬ngered as the source of the BBC WMD-deception story, and had fallen into a depression.