Tag: trump economy
Not 'Liberated' Yet: Trade Deficit Hits Highest Level Since March 2025

Not 'Liberated' Yet: Trade Deficit Hits Highest Level Since March 2025

Donald Trump has made reducing the trade deficit a centerpiece of his economic agenda. As he has put it, the deficit means foreigners are ripping us off. Trump’s whole “Liberation Day” story was about putting an end to the rip-offs.

We can debate the extent to which the trade deficit means we are getting ripped off, but even accepting Trump’s claim, he is not doing a very good job by his own metric. On Tuesday, we got data from the Commerce Department showing that the monthly trade deficit jumped by $23 billion in May to $77.6 billion. The deficit would be $931 billion if this rate continued for a full year. This is the highest it’s been since March of 2025. If the trade deficit measures the extent to which we’re being ripped off, we’re going the wrong way.

To be clear, the story is a bit more complicated. The trade deficit had averaged $70.9 billion through the first ten months of 2024. It then jumped after the election, hitting $96.9 billion in December, as people rushed to buy cars, appliances, and other big-ticket items, and businesses stocked their inventories, before Trump’s promised tariffs went into effect.

It rose further in the first three months of 2025 as people became more convinced that Trump was serious about his tariffs. The peak was $133 billion in March. The deficit then fell sharply in April. Part of this story was the impact of the tariffs themselves, and part was that people who had bought cars and other big-ticket items in anticipation of the tariffs were not about to buy them again.

The impact of people buying in anticipation of tariffs had probably worn off by the start of this year, so we could see the direct impact of tariffs on the trade deficit. The average for the first four months of 2026 was $55.1 billion. That would translate into an annual trade deficit of $661 billion, a bit more than 2.0 percent of GDP. That is down from the $850 billion annual rate we had in the first ten months of 2024, but still far from balanced trade for those who care about such things.

But we then took a big step in the other direction in May. It seems the main story here is imports of AI-related capital goods. Imports of capital goods were $1.1 billion higher in May than they had been in April and $17.2 billion higher than they had been in January.

Many of the computer chips and other items that the big AI companies need for their data centers are imported, mostly from Taiwan and South Korea. If we think the trade deficit means we are being ripped off by foreigners, the AI bubble is increasing the extent of the rip-off.

Monthly trade data are highly erratic, and it’s possible that the May jump will be reversed in June or subsequent months. But for now, the data make it look like Liberation Day didn’t have its intended effect.

Dean Baker is a senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and the author of the 2016 book Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

Troubling Signal: 'Fast-Food Index' Of Consumer Sentiment Is Falling Fast

Troubling Signal: 'Fast-Food Index' Of Consumer Sentiment Is Falling Fast

For the last several years, I’ve been using real spending at fast food restaurants as a gauge for assessing how the non-rich are feeling about their personal finances. The logic is that it is a type of discretionary spending where people can easily make cutbacks if they are feeling squeezed.

Also, it should not be affected much by the spending of the rich. It’s not likely that Elon Musk eats more Big Macs when his wealth increases or he cuts back when SpaceX’s stock plunges.

And to be clear, I’m not saying the rich don’t eat fast food. I’m sure they do. The claim is just that their consumption of fast food is not affected much by changes in their short-term financial situation.

Anyhow, the story the index has been telling us in the last year is not a good one.


After rising at a healthy pace through 2023 (the January number was an upward blip), spending had been largely flat through 2024 and the first half of 2025. It then rose in the summer and peaked at an annual rate of $386.2 billion in September. Since then, it has fallen sharply, hitting $366.8 billion in May, a decline of just over 4.0 percent from its peak.

That would seem to indicate that people are feeling pretty bad about their economic situation. This is consistent with the bad numbers being reported in the consumer confidence indexes.

I’ve had people suggest to me that this decline could be driven by the increased use of Ozempic or related drugs. This would be a positive spin, since it would probably be good for people’s health if they consumed less fast food.

Unfortunately, that does not seem likely to explain this sort of decline. By 2024, 12 percent of the adult population was already taking a GLP-1 drug. The increase in usage did not prevent fast-food consumption from rising rapidly in 2023 and at least staying flat in 2024.

The number of people using these drugs has undoubtedly continued to rise, but probably not by enough to explain the sharp drop in consumption over the last 8 months. The drop in spending is likely giving us bad news about the state of the economy, not good news on public health.

People’s negative assessments of the economy continue to be somewhat of a mystery. The recent run-up in gas prices and inflation more generally is unambiguously bad news, but is this the worst economy ever, as some of the consumer confidence measures have been showing? Real income for those at the middle and bottom has generally been rising by standard measures, so it seems that we’re missing something, and I’m not sure any of us have figured out what.

The fast-food index is telling us what people do and not just what they say. And what they do is telling us that they don’t feel very good about the economy.

Dean Baker is a senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and the author of the 2016 book Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

RIP Alan Greenspan: Why New Fed Chair Warsh Shouldn't Imitate His Cryptic Style

RIP Alan Greenspan: Why New Fed Chair Warsh Shouldn't Imitate His Cryptic Style

I was not an Alan Greenspan fan, but I will give him some serious credit on his passing. I’ll also give him serious blame for missing two huge bubbles, the collapse of which gave us serious recessions. I’ll also add a comment about the opaque way he ran the Fed, to which I fear our new Fed chair is returning.

Starting with the positive, Greenspan allowed the unemployment rate to fall to 4.0% as a year-round average in 2000. This was huge. The prevailing view in the economics profession had been that the unemployment rate could not fall much below 6.0% without triggering spiraling inflation.

Greenspan was not a mainstream economist and therefore did not accept this view. In 1995, when the unemployment rate was already under 6.0%, he famously argued with two ostensibly more liberal Fed governors, Janet Yellen and Lawrence Meyer, over this point. They both wanted Greenspan to raise rates to head off inflation. Greenspan insisted that he didn’t see evidence of inflation and was not going to raise rates just because the unemployment rate was low.

Greenspan stood pat as the unemployment rate fell to 5.0% and then 4.5%, and finally in 2000 to 4.0% as a year-round average. We actually had several months of 3.9% and 3.8% unemployment. This allowed millions of workers to get jobs who would have otherwise remain unemployed if Yellen and Meyer had gotten their way.

Even more importantly, the low unemployment of the late 1990s gave tens of millions of workers the bargaining power to secure real wage gains. This was the first period of sustained real wage growth for low- and middle-wage earners since the early 1970s. The low unemployment of this period also set a benchmark for the future, where economists recognized that 6.0% unemployment was not a floor. (Yes, we can do better with a federal jobs policy, but that is not Alan Greenspan’s domain.)

Greenspan and the Bubbles

Greenspan decided to ignore the two huge bubbles that grew under his watch. He famously commented about the irrational exuberance in the stock market in 1996, which quickly sent stocks tumbling. Greenspan then mumbled some nonsense about growth possibly justifying market prices, and stocks recovered and continued to rise for another three and a half years.

The bubble began to deflate in March of 2000, and the market eventually lost close to half its value. The NASDAQ, where the major tech stocks were listed, lost almost 80%. The popular wisdom is that the resulting recession in 2001 was short and mild. This was not true from a labor market perspective. We went four full years without creating jobs and the strong real wage growth of the late 1990s quickly stopped and went into reverse.

The next bubble was even worse. There was already some evidence of a housing bubble in the late 1990s, as house sale prices began to outpace inflation. They also outpaced rents, which were still rising roughly in step with overall inflation.

This divergence increased in the 00s, triggered in part by low interest rates, but also incredibly lax lending standards. At their peak in 2006, house sale prices had risen 70% in real terms compared to where they were a decade before. The subsequent collapse gave us a financial crisis and the worst recession since the Great Depression, as the unemployment rate nearly reached 10.0%.

After the collapse all the people in economic policy positions gave themselves a “who could have known?” amnesty. The answer of course was everyone should have known. The dodgy lending practices of mortgage issuers were hardly a secret; they were bragging about it. People were buying houses with no money down and in many cases even borrowing more than the value of their home to cover moving expenses and closing costs. The same was true for the securitization that allowed issuers to offload any mortgages immediately after it was sold, regardless of the quality.

In an interview that Greenspan gave to the Washington Post after the crash, he commented that he had become concerned that the share of subprime mortgages had jumped to 25% in 2005. He said he couldn’t remember if he had passed this information on to his successor, Ben Bernanke, when he stepped down in 2006.

This was infuriating. The idea that the Fed chair was not aware of the explosion in subprime lending (even worse Alt-A, which had risen to 15%) was truly incredible. It’s not clear if it would be worse if Greenspan’s claim was true or not.

Remedies for Bubbles

I have written about this before, but I’ll just make a couple of points here. First, in the case of the stock bubble, I think talk would have gone a long way. Greenspan’s offhand “irrational exuberance” comment had a huge effect. Imagine he had the Fed churning out papers showing how stock prices were completely out of line with pretty much all projections of future GDP and profit growth.

The point is not that investors had to agree with Alan Greenspan, but they would have to answer him. The “who could have known?” defense might save a fund manager when it is just random gadflies yelling about a bubble. It is a very different story when a Fed chair is putting out the warning. A person managing tens of billions at a pension fund or endowment will be looking at the unemployment line if, after the crash, they say they didn’t pay Greenspan any attention.

In the case of the housing bubble, in addition to warnings, the Fed has substantial regulatory authority. The bad practices of banks and other financial institutions were easy to see. The Fed could have cracked down. Instead, they could not even be bothered to issue updated mortgage lending guidelines until after the crash.

Greenspan Thought the Fed Should be Opaque

This one is timely since our new Fed chair, Kevin Warsh, seems to want to turn back to the Greenspan era. Since I just wrote about this last week, I’ll pick up part of what I said.

“Under Alan Greenspan, the Fed was deliberately opaque. I remember walking to work one day in the mid-1990s, the day after Greenspan had given some big speech. Back then, we had newspaper boxes where you could buy the paper. I always glanced at the machines as I walked by. Half of the papers had headlines saying something to the effect of “Greenspan Plans to Raise Rates.” The headlines for the other half were something to the effect “Greenspan to Leave Rates Unchanged.”

“Greenspan, who followed his press closely, was reportedly delighted. He had given a major speech, and no one had any idea what he was talking about.

“Ben Bernanke, his immediate successor, wanted the Fed to be more transparent. He explicitly introduced the concept of “forward guidance” to Fed policy: the idea that the Fed would tell people where it expected interest rates to go in the near-term future. In their tenures as Fed chair, both Janet Yellen and Jerome Powell continued this policy. Their view was that they did not want the public to be surprised by the Fed’s decisions.”

I argued that this makes good sense both from the standpoint of the economy, being clear about Fed plans creates more certainty for investment decisions and is also important for reducing corruption. As I noted:

“Wayne Angell, who served as a Fed governor from 1986 to 1994, began consulting at the rate of $100 a minute (roughly $220 in today’s dollars) after he stepped down from his position in 1994. Angell may have been an insightful observer of the national economy, but he was obviously being paid for his knowledge of his former colleagues’ views on interest rates.

“If the Fed is fully transparent about its intentions, no one is going to get paid $220 a minute for their insights on what the FOMC is thinking. We don’t know how far Warsh will look to go with this move away from Fed transparency, but the further he goes the more room there is for corruption.”

Anyhow, Greenspan’s deliberate opaqueness was not a good policy for the Fed. We should hope that Kevin Warsh does not follow his example as chair.

Warsh and Trump

Despite Troubling Signs, Warsh's Smooth Fed Debut Stays Course On Rates

I found the new Fed chair’s debut to be fascinating, comforting, and worrisome. Which is in itself interesting because Chair Kevin “Taskforce” Warsh (“Task” for short) talked a lot but said very little of note. Here are my takeaways.

What did the committee do? Not only did they hold rates steady, as expected, but there was a more hawkish tilt to their expectations re future rates. Compared to their last meeting, the committee expects the interest rate they control to be higher both this year and next.

This change can be seen in the “dot plot” wherein the 19 committee members anonymously say where they think rates will need to go. Except there were only 18 dots for ‘26 and ‘27 and 17 for ‘28. Chair Warsh told us he’d abstained and someone else apparently joined him for ‘28.

I’ll have more to say about his abstention in a moment, but this hawkish tilt takes me to my next point.

I said “worrisome” above. Why? The theme of the statement, the dots, and Warsh’s presser were all, quite reasonably in my view (this was part of the comforting part), about how the economy and labor market are doing pretty well, but inflation remains high and sticky. Even with Trump looking over his shoulder, Warsh would have been hard pressed to oppose the committee’s neutral/tightening bias. That’s just where the inflation data are right now.

But “Task” isn’t new to this neighborhood, and I’ve long argued he just played a dove to get the job. That’s why I was struck—and maybe kinda over-reacted—to the FOMC statement a few minutes after its release:

The rest says: “...so no need to got there. But knowing Warsh's proclivities in this regard, I don't like it.”

Here’s why we should be nervous that Warsh will consistently down-weight the full-employment side of the mandate relative to the price-stability side:

—He’s long been a hard-money guy who worries more about inflation eroding asset values than unemployment eroding bargaining power and paychecks.

—He barely referenced the employment side of the mandate in his confirmation hearing.

—He hired Paul Winfree to be a temporary adviser as he settles into the new gig. This is the guy who wrote the (generally bonkers) Fed chapter in Project 2025, which calls for getting rid of the full employment part of the mandate.

Like I said, this concern isn’t new, and I tend to overreact when I think someone is threatening full employment conditions—a personality flaw for which I emphatically do not apologize. But this potential bias bears close watching.

What else did I find comforting? That would be the fact that Warsh didn’t come out swinging, going off on his colleagues for their tightening bias, signaling Trump, as Stephen Miran did, that he would push for cuts, regardless of the data. He praised his FOMC colleagues and the staff, and was generally highly diplomatic.

Now, if readers who know my proclivities conclude that my comfort should be Trump’s discomfort, I agree. This was a hawkish meeting, more so than expected, and Warsh went along with it. If Powell did that, Trump’s thumbs would have been spewing fire on social media, but he held his fire yesterday.

I took this as a win for Fed independence, but it’s way too soon to conclude that we’re safe in that regard. Still, you know my mantra: A bad day for Trump is a good day for America.

Anything else from the debut? Yeah, a few things.

—I’ve argued in recent posts that I take Warsh’s point how an excess of Fed communication isn’t helpful and can be harmful, leading markets and Fed watchers to overreact to stray voltage. But after yesterday, I’m worried he will push that too far, providing too little information in ways that could lead to unnecessary volatility and the return of the Fed-guessing-game that “forward guidance” was designed to end.

The statement was too bare bones, I thought, and Warsh wouldn’t answer any questions about where he thought things were headed, providing us no information on his “reaction function,” meaning how he and FOMC are processing the data with regard to rate movements. Whenever he was asked a question about this, he told us that he’d be setting up a taskforce to look into that. It became a comic tag line.

I doubt I was the only one who missed Powell’s plain speaking, his earnest efforts to clearly explain how he and his colleagues were thinking about things. In a word, Warsh was really quite opaque, and if that continues, it will generate problems born of insufficient communication.

—I’ve been to this taskforce rodeo many times, and have even led one or two. The majority of taskforces do little; they’re set up to give the appearance of doing something about a problem for which you don’t have a tractable solution. Some, however, yield important, actionable results. My prior in this case is that most of the many taskforces that Task announced yesterday won’t change much, with the exception of the communications/forward-guidance one.

That’s enough for now, and we’ll have ample time to scrutinize the new chair. I’m glad he didn’t come out swinging and I appreciate the seriousness about getting inflation back to target, especially with Trump lurking in the background. But I’ve got serious concerns that warrant close watching.

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please subscribe to his Substack, from which this is reprinted with permission.


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