Tag: strait of hormuz
Ceasefire! What Might This Mean for the Strait, the Markets, and You

Ceasefire! What Might This Mean for the Strait, the Markets, and You

As I suspect you’ve heard, a two-week ceasefire appears to be in place in the war with Iran. That is unequivocally good news, though no one paying attention can breath anything like a sigh of relief, despite the relief rally going on this morning in equity markets, with West Texas Intermediate oil down ~$20 as I write this (which will have moved by the time you read this).

There are more questions than answers and for the (scant) details as we know them, go to any news source you trust. But here are my quick impressions. Hovering over all of them are “What was that for? What did thousands of people have to lose their lives for?”

Let me be unequivocal about this. I’ll be very happy if the parties in this conflict can find the offramp they appear to be seeking. But I fear this will be no occasion for celebration. Iran’s hardline theocracy remains in place, and worse, appears ready to continue their operation of turning the Strait of Hormuz into a tollbooth, which would be a massive cash cow for them. If you’re thinking “the U.S. would never let that stand!” you might be right, but that could well mean the ceasefire ends and the conflict restarts.

My top priority is that nobody else gets killed because of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s aggressions. But I don’t celebrate the arsonist who puts out the fire he started.

With that, a few impressions of where we are. They talk about the fog of war, but what I’m about to try to see through is the fog of this ceasefire, with an econ-more-than-a-geopolitical angle.

—Feeling the Blues in the Strait of Hormuz: A key Iranian condition for the ceasefire is that "safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations."

This is bad. To me, and to some press reports, it reads like they’ll ramp up their control of who transits (relative to pre-war), possibly with a cap on traffic, and with a toll (the number $2 million per vessel has circulated for a while).

We don’t know how private shippers will respond, but what choice do they have? At least in the medium term, there's nowhere near enough supply-chain alternatives to move product out into the globe. If this is broadly correct, and if this condition stands, it suggests that a new, post-war SoH transit premium will be added to the price of oil and other goods coming through the Strait, one that will continue to be passed forward to consumers.

—The Way We Were: Will Markets/Oil Just Revert to Prewar Levels/Trends? Unknowable, but, at least re oil, not if the aforementioned premium kicks in. Equity markets, though they trended down toward correction territory, broadly expected Trump to back down, so the relief rally is solidly underway as I write this AM: Here’s the S&P pre-opening futures:

Gas is up this morning ($4.16/gal), and if the oil decline sticks, we’ll have a real-time test of the old rockets/feathers dynamic, where the gas price takes the elevator up and the stairs down.

I’m not in the biz of predicting where markets will go but if the result of this war, as some are predicting, is to crimp the existing supply chain of fossil fuels, it would raise prices and dampen global growth at some margin. But it could also stimulate new activity to find workarounds to this obviously dysfunction choke point, and put more wind power in the sails of renewable energy development. (You know my views on this: as I said to Shalanda Young yesterday, if I were in charge, I’d do the Canadian Shuffle and allow a nice bunch of Chinese EVs into the US, conditional on some degree of tech-transfer and joint production.)

—Will It Stick? I find the fact that the Trump administration is apparently allowing Iran’s 10-point plan to be a starting place for ceasefire negotiations to be very surprising and a symbol of how desperate Trump is for an offramp. He’s gone from promising to end their civilization at 8pm ET to “sure, we’re cool with sitting down to chat about you keeping your nukes and controlling the Strait.” You’ll see what I mean if you look their list.

I’ve been following Tobin Marcus from Wolfe Research on these matters, who writes this morning (with Chutong Zhu):

If the US were outright accepting Iran's 10 points as they're now being reported, this would be a huge surprise and a massive concession, with the US accepting various Iranian red lines and giving up on our own, including on the nuclear file. On the other hand, if defining the 10 points as a "basis for negotiations" does not imply acceptance of those points, then it's unclear how close the two sides really are in the ongoing negotiations. It's a little hard to believe that Trump is accepting anything like Iran's 10 points, and the WH seems to be telling Israel we're doing nothing of the sort, so we lean toward interpreting this as intentional wiggle-room to facilitate an offramp, which raises questions about the likelihood that the next two weeks of negotiations will actually culminate in a permanent deal.

In other words, there’s a tension between Trump’s usual play—break something, declare victory, move on to breaking something else—and accepting what should be unacceptable. And it is impossible to know at this point how that balances out. If you pushed me to take a side, I’d guess he’s more likely to mush up some version of pushing back on the most egregious Iranian conditions and turn tail outta there.

—What Does All This Mean For Regular Folks Just Trying to Go About Their Lives? As you know, this is always my touchstone up in here. Assuming the ceasefire sticks, Strait of Hormuz traffic picks up, and the oil price falls at least part of the way back to its prewar level, the gas price should slowly come down, much as we predicted here. That still cuts meaningfully into real disposable incomes, and, as I’ve been worrying about, lower real wage gains. I’m watching carefully to see how the March headline CPI, out Friday, compares to the most recent pace of mid/low wage growth of 3.4 percent.

But more broadly, for folks just trying to make ends meet, this misadventure in the Middle East is yet another Trumpian own goal kick in their faces. The Trump tariffs, the Trump budget, the Trump war—they’re all making life more expensive for people, which is especially ironic given that those people will tell you that their main economic concern is affordability.

And never forget the opportunity costs: if you’re spending all your time making things worse, you’ve squandered the time you could have spent making things better. Imagine that instead of negotiating a 10-point plan that gives the Iranian regime what they want, we were negotiating a 10-point plan for affordable housing, childcare, and healthcare.

I’ve said it before, including yesterday, so sorry—not sorry—for being repetitious. But any Democrat who seeks to retain and win office that isn’t working to operationalize that contrast needs to immediately get out of the way and make room for someone who will fight their a— off on behalf of these priorities.

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

Reprinted with permission from Econjared.


Iran Hawks Must Confront The Catastrophic Failure Of Trump's Leadership

Iran Hawks Must Confront The Catastrophic Failure Of Trump's Leadership

I am an Iran hardliner. But I'm struggling to understand how other hardliners can be so credulous about President Donald Trump's leadership of this war. It's as if you were stranded by the side of the road and accepted a ride from an obviously drunk driver.

Earlier this month, the Wall Street Journal editorial board scolded those of us who were not cheerleading for this war: "There's remarkable pessimism in the media and political class about the U.S. bombing campaign against the terrorist regime in Iran. Five days into the war, you'd think from the coverage and commentary that the U.S. is losing."

In the weeks since, the Journal, along with other unreconstructed hawks, has worried that Trump may not "finish the job" and have chided doubters by reminding us of the many depredations perpetrated by Teheran.

But here's the problem with the hawks' posture: You cannot separate the war from the people directing it.

Trump fans believe he always has a plan — that if he threatens, cajoles, or pivots, it's a sign of his unique ability to keep others off balance. To me, it looks like he's the one who's off balance. How do they account for Trump's pronouncements early in this now monthlong war that it was "won in the first hour"? Do they recall Trump's proclamation on March 6 that he would accept only "unconditional surrender"? What about the demand, five days into the conflict, that Trump have a say in choosing Iran's next leader? Did all of that suggest the smooth unfurling of a master plan or clear evidence that he expected a quick and decisive toppling of the regime and was surprised by reality?

The Iran hawks stress that the regime is one of the most dangerous and repressive on the planet and note that the region and the world would be so much better off without the mullahs in charge. Yes. But: Where is the evidence that a bombing campaign led by an impulsive narcissist can achieve that goal? Was there a Plan B if the bombing failed to ignite a popular uprising? How confident can we really be that Iran will, in the long term, be less dangerous, less hostile to the United States and Israel, less likely to support terrorism, less brutal to its own people thanks to Trump's "excursion"?

One of Trump's throughlines is the belief that other leaders and specifically his predecessors have failed to achieve goals due to "stupidity" and lack of will. Enraptured by America's military might, he imagines that threatening it and using it are the skeleton keys to pick any lock. There are no complex challenges requiring subtlety and discretion. There is no understanding that not every problem can be solved through the application of force. He disdains expertise, preferring to surround himself with lickspittles who bring only good news.

And when reality intrudes, as it did when his 2017 inauguration crowds were smaller than Obama's, or the COVID pandemic was not less harmful than the flu, or he lost the 2020 election, he chooses to believe lies and to insist that everyone else assent to the lies as well. Lies are his pacifier. When such a toddler is calling the shots in a war, it's acutely dangerous.

What Trump should be learning (though he isn't) is that previous presidents refrained from attacking Iran not out of fecklessness but because they weighed the risks. Yes, Iran is a weaker nation militarily than the United States (or even Israel), but it happens to own the high ground above the Strait of Hormuz.

Days into the war, Trump crowed that Iran had "no navy." But even as Trump spoke, Iran was in the process of disabling the Strait of Hormuz through the use of drones and fastboats and threatening to mine it. Meanwhile, they are charging a hefty toll for the ships they allow to pass, a new revenue stream for the regime.

Because Trump pulled the trigger without securing political or popular support, without allies (save one) and without considering how much damage to the world economy Iran could inflict, he is highly vulnerable to economic pain, and the Iranians know it. That's their asymmetric advantage. As a military matter, it doesn't matter that they have no navy. They don't have to hit a single ship in the strait. Their threats are hitting the insurance companies, and that's enough.

A large share of the world's supply of not just oil and gas but also helium, fertilizer and other chemicals now relies largely on the Iranian regime. We teeter on the edge of a worldwide recession and widespread hunger. Yet we are being led in this war by a fantasist who does not assimilate reality. "Trump is getting a little bored with Iran," an administration official indicated last week. "Not that he regrets it or something — he's just bored and wants to move on."

It's impossible to say which is more alarming, Trump's inattention or his engagement.

Mona Charen is policy editor of The Bulwark and host of the "Beg to Differ" podcast. Her new book, Hard Right: The GOP's Drift Toward Extremism, is available now.

Reprinted with permission from Creators

Why America Is On Its Own: Slavery, Tariffs And Trump's Dire Strait

Why America Is On Its Own: Slavery, Tariffs And Trump's Dire Strait

Donald Trump is now pleading with other countries to rescue his war on Iran by helping to open the Strait of Hormuz — although Trump being Trump, his pleas for assistance take the form of threats. Regardless, help is not on the way. Germany, Australia and Japan have flatly said no, while Britain and France have been slightly equivocal but at most hinted at willingness to supply forces after the fighting stops.

Why this effectively unanmous rejection? A large part of the answer is that other countries couldn’t secure the Strait even if they wanted to. Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister, was outright caustic in remarks Monday:

What does (...) Donald Trump expect a handful or two handfuls of European frigates to do in the Strait of Hormuz that the powerful U.S. Navy cannot do?

Beyond that, who wants to take risks in support of a U.S. government that nobody trusts, a government that neither shows gratitude for aid nor punishes those who do America harm?

Indeed, even as Trump begs in his graceless way for help, his administration is preparing to hit the very nations he is appealing to with another round of tariffs — tariffs that will be imposed based on an obviously false, bad faith, totally insulting argument.

As most readers probably know, almost a year ago Trump imposed tariffs on almost every other nation, including islands inhabited only by penguins, by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This use of IEEPA was blatantly illegal, and after dragging its heels for many months, the Supreme Court finally agreed with lower courts that the tariffs were, in fact, illegal.

One important point that isn’t emphasized enough is that in addition to being illegal under U.S. law, the IEEPA tariffs were a gross breach of contract. Most U.S. tariff rates were set in 1995, as part of the negotiations that among other things created the World Trade Organization. These tariffs were “bound” by international agreements, which have almost as much force as treaties. But the U.S. just ripped those agreements up, without even trying to make a case for its actions.

Now the IEEPA tariffs are gone, but Trump isn’t giving up. On Sunday night he posted a long, falsehood-filled rant about the Court, beginning with a condemnation of its tariff ruling. And while he can’t simply defy Supreme Court rulings — not yet, anyway — his officials have been scrambling for legal strategies to reimpose high tariffs.

And the main one they’ve come up with is a doozy. Under U.S. law the executive branch has the authority to impose tariffs without new legislation in certain specified circumstances. These include Section 232 tariffs to protect national security, the (spurious) basis for most of the tariffs that survived the Supreme Court’s ruling. (I’m ignoring the Section 122 tariffs currently in place to deal with a nonexistent balance of payments crisis, not because they’re legal — they clearly aren’t — but because they will expire this summer.)

Looking forward, however, Trump officials are planning to impose another major round of tariffs using Section 301, designed to cope with unfair foreign trading practices. In particular, they’re proposing tariffs on 60 (!) countries, including Canada, the UK and the European Union, that they accuse of violating rules against international trade in goods produced with forced labor.

Wait — is the administration accusing Canada and Europe of using slave labor to produce their exports? No, they’re saying that these countries’ governments are guilty of “failure to impose and effectively enforce a ban on the importation of goods produced with forced labor,” and that these failures “burden or restrict U.S. commerce.” In other words, they’re going to slap tariffs on Canada, not because they claim that Canada uses slave labor, but because China does, and they claim that Canada is hurting America because it isn’t doing enough to stop those slave-produced goods from entering its own market.

Nobody, and I mean nobody, believes this story. Nobody believes that Canada or Europe are worse at policing global slave labor than the U.S. is. In fact, nobody believes that the Trump administration even cares about slave labor. After all, the alleged concerns that are about to be used to raise tariffs were nowhere to be found until the Court ruled against IEEPA.

So this is nothing but an excuse for another attempted end-run around the law — an end-run that is also a massive insult to other democratic nations, the same nations Trump is pleading with for help in undoing the disaster he has created in the Persian Gulf.

The point is that it’s all of a piece. The current U.S. government has, as Trump would say, treated our erstwhile allies very, very badly in multiple ways, with the arbitrary, illegal imposition of tariffs the most consequential. And now those erstwhile allies have no inclination to help Trump out of the Iran trap he created for himself. Funny how that works.

Paul Krugman is a Nobel Prize-winning economist and former professor at MIT and Princeton who now teaches at the City University of New York's Graduate Center. From 2000 to 2024, he wrote a column for The New York Times. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

Reprinted with permission from Paul Krugman.

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