Tag: trump inflation
Top Trump Adviser: Rising Gas Prices Show 'People Are Optimistic About The Future'

Top Trump Adviser: Rising Gas Prices Show 'People Are Optimistic About The Future'

President Donald Trump’s failure to negotiate an end to his war with Iran has led the administration to now absurdly claim the resulting rise in gas prices are a good sign for the economy.

Kevin Hassett, the Trump-appointed director of the National Economic Council, made the claim during an appearance on Fox News Sunday.

“People are spending more on gas, but they’re also spending more on everything else—not just groceries but restaurants and so on. And I think that’s a sign that you would see when people are optimistic about the future,” Hassett said.

In the weeks following Trump’s choice to attack Iran, which has caused the closure of the vital Strait of Hormuz shipping route, gas prices have reached an average of $4.32 per gallon, according to the American Automobile Association. That is significantly more than the $3.14 that a gallon cost at this time last year.

No serious economist would argue that rapidly increasing the cost of a necessity like fuel could be seen as a positive economic indicator, and the Trump administration is aware of this.

Increased fuel costs, along with Trump’s increased tariffs, have caused inflation to rise. According to the Commerce Department, inflation reached 3.8 percent year-over-year in April, the highest rate that has been measured since May 2023.

The recovering economy that Trump inherited from former President Joe Biden is being washed away by Trump’s actions.

On his Truth Social account, Trump fumed on Sunday night that he is receiving criticism for his diplomatic impotence. Trump and his team have continually promised that a “deal” with Iran is imminent, but for weeks, nothing substantial has materialized.

“[D]on’t the Dumocrats, and various seemingly unpatriotic Republicans, understand that it is MUCH tougher for me to properly do my job and negotiate, when political hacks keep negatively ‘chirping,’ at levels never seen before, over and over again, that I should move faster, or move slower, or go to war, or not go to war, or whatever,” Trump wrote.

He concluded: “Just sit back and relax, it will all work out well in the end – It always does!”

Reprinted with permission from Daily Kos

Trump's China Visit Displayed His Weakness, Narcissism And Insecurity

Trump's China Visit Displayed His Weakness, Narcissism And Insecurity

More often than not, the geopolitical impact of high-level summitry takes times to reveal itself, so perhaps history will record this differently than I do here. But virtually all the reporting from the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing last week suggests the US came out looking like the weaker partner.

Anyone whose been paying attention could see this coming. Donald Trump has two modes in foreign policy: bully those who he believes he has sway over, and be the supplicant to those who have something he admires. Strategic assessment and pursuit of goals that would help the US and its citizens are beyond his reach.

Moreover, Trump went into the summit with a sharp disadvantage: it’s no secret to anyone, most notably his Chinese counterparties, that he has dragged the US into a costly war with no clear rationale. Even worse, we’re stuck in the conflict as a tiny opposition army continues to hold us to a stalemate. Such weakness is toxic in this context, emboldening Beijing in its designs on Taiwan, a situation made significantly worse by Trump’s suggesting that “a potential multibillion-dollar weapons sale to Taiwan" is a “negotiating chip” with China, "raising new doubts about the pace and scale of American military support for the island democracy.”

The problem is that Trump’s approach to foreign policy is extremely simplistic, and is all about, to cite his favorite phrase, “who holds the cards?” Like all insecure narcissists1, he’s a bully who aspires to intimidate other leaders over whom we have an advantage, as in we buy more from them than they do from us. But Xi recognized early on that even while we have a large goods trade deficit with China, we require access to their rare earths, of which they refine 90 percent of global capacity. In those cases, Trump’s foreign policy reduces to making sure the opposing leader is his “friend,” a word he used frequently, if unrequitedly, to describe Xi in this visit.

End of the day, it looks like the two main results of this summit are 1) China might buy more soybeans and Boeing aircraft from us, though this remains unconfirmed, and if past is precedent, the likelihood that such an “agreement” will hold is low, and 2) Xi has further confirmation that the US is weakened by a feckless yet unchecked president who has alienated his international allies, is more focused on his ballroom than expanding American influence, and is bogged down in what is surely the most unpopular war in recent history.

None of this is at all surprising or even that interesting. The more compelling question is what, if anything, does all the above mean for the average American, or for that matter, to the average Chinese citizen, who, for the record, is one of 1.4 billion? This essay by Yi-Ling Liu tries to get at that:

Moving between the two countries, I’ve been struck by how they have come to mirror and resemble each other. There is a shared sense of precarity that lies beneath the envy and distrust: The technological future is taking shape at vertiginous speed, yet its promise is not shared by all.

I’m sure that’s true, and while it’s worse now given the AI-driven angst and uncertainty, along with the exacerbated wealth concentration—in both countries—that I see as another symptom of this technology’s proliferation, such precarity is nothing new.

In fact, it’s inherent to economies both capitalistic and communistic. What matters then is what guardrails the political system puts in place to protect innocent bystanders from everything from job displacements to higher utility costs driven by data centers. It’s what pathways to opportunity we clear for those whose economic starting point blocks their access. It’s the affordability policies we put in place to help people meet their basic needs for healthcare, housing, childcare, and food.

Our federal government is making life more precarious, and, while I’m no expert, I don’t think China’s doing much better. To be clear, I’m not saying international diplomacy is a sideshow. But I am saying that most Americans can be forgiven for being a lot less interested in whether Xi is Trump’s “friend” than what’s left in their paycheck after they filled their gas tank.

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please consider subscribing to his Substack, from which this is reprinted with permission.


Fed Chair Confirmation Hearing Raises Grave Concerns About Nominee Kevin Warsh

Fed Chair Confirmation Hearing Raises Grave Concerns About Nominee Kevin Warsh

Kevin Warsh had his confirmation hearing yesterday to chair the Federal Reserve once current chair Jerome Powell’s term ends in mid-May. I’ve got a few choice words for these confirmation hearings in general, as they’ve become a big waste of time and should either be scrapped or somehow reformed. They’ve devolved into a signaling exercise that has almost nothing to do with the substance of the nominee’s work. And I speak from experience, as I had to go through a Senate confirmation (wherein I prevailed by 50-49 baby, i.e., with room to spare!).

In that light, I couldn’t watch much of this one. Too painful. But I closely followed it and can report on what I think we might be getting, once the Tillis hold is resolved (you can read about that here) and Warsh takes the chair (once he’s out of committee, he’ll get a majority in the Senate).

Between his opening statement and back-and-forth with the senators on the Banking Committee, I listened carefully to try to discern two things. First, and most important, Warsh’s independence from Trump, and second, what sort of monetary policy he might favor. In both cases, the signals were highly jammed by the posturing and shape-shifting that has made these confirmations largely futile exercises.

For one, Warsh really wants this job—he’s not alone in that—and he knows Trump is listening to him. He therefore has three choices: speak truth to power, Trump’s wrath be damned; mush it up so no one knows what he’s saying; just tell Trump what he wants to hear.

He largely chose the third path. This was no profile in courage. He wouldn’t say that Trump lost the 2020 election. He would not support either Lisa Cook or Powell against Trump’s attacks. More tellingly and substantively, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) challenged Warsh on the case for Fed rate cuts, given the fact that inflation has been above the Fed’s target for five years, and that was before war-induced price pressures. His line of questioning asked if a Federal funds rate of one percent would be too low right now, which should be an easy softball as even Trump’s appointee Fed Gov. Stephen Miran is not suggesting such an aggressive cut. But Warsh refused to admit that given current inflationary pressures, one percent would be too low a rate.

This is all concerning in terms of independence from Trump, and in normal circumstances would disqualify him. But anyone in that seat is in a vise, and it doesn’t make sense for them to accept the nomination and antagonize Trump. By showing up, Warsh is basically saying “I’m going to say pleasing things to Trump in order to get the job. They may or may not be true.” In fact, I think they’re mostly not true—my call from a while back that he’s a monetary hawk imitating a dove is looking good after this hearing, but we’ll get to that.

Bottom line, based on this performance, we must be nervous about Fed independence under Warsh, as would be the case with any Trump nominee. He’s shown himself to be a politically motivated shape-shifter, which makes it hard to know how he’d actually handle the independence question. It’s analogous to those Supreme Court justice confirmations wherein they invariably say, “don’t worry—I’m just there to call balls and strikes” and then, in many cases, implement a strike zone that’s more ideological than balanced.

Turning to how he’d govern, even as he sold himself as a rate-cutting dove, I saw numerous signs to the contrary. Before I get to them however, read this Atlantic take from Roge Karma back in January. Here’s how I weighed in:

…Warsh is seen as an inflation hawk who will err on the side of higher, not lower, interest rates. During the 2010s, he became known within Wall Street and Washington circles as one of the fiercest critics of the Fed’s zero-interest-rate policy, to the point of warning about inflation when unemployment was still at 10 percent. “He’s a pretty stone-cold hard-money guy,” Jared Bernstein, who served as the chair of Joe Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers, told me. “It’s a peculiar choice for Trump, because the Fed that Warsh wants is very different from the one Trump wants.”

If you listen carefully to both what Warsh said and, more tellingly, didn’t say, you can see what I mean. His opening statement mentions the full employment side of the Fed’s mandate once in passing, focusing far more intensely on the inflation side:

…Congress tasked the Fed with the mission to ensure price stability, without excuse or equivocation, argument or anguish. Inflation is a choice, and the Fed must take responsibility for it. Low inflation is the Fed’s plot armor, its vital protection again slings and arrows. So, when inflation surges—as it has done in recent years—grievous harm is done to our citizens, especially to the least well-off. They lose purchasing power. Their standard of living falls. They may also lose faith in our system of economic governance, raising doubts whether monetary policy independence is all it’s cracked up to be.

Such passion! Such concern for the poor! And he’s not wrong about the damage from high inflation (though the “inflation is a choice” part is off—exogenous supply shocks happen). But, replace the word “inflation” with “unemployment” and “purchasing power” with income. You can and should listen for yourself—here’s the full video—but I saw and heard a hawk in dove’s clothing.

If so, his internal weighting of the two sides of the mandate would be different from that of Powell, Yellen, Bernanke, who all seemed pretty balanced to me, though of course, pre-pandemic, inflation tended to run below target so the low correlation between unemployment and inflation (flat Phillips Curve) gave them more leeway to pursue lower unemployment.

Two caveats re this hawkish contention of mine. First, there is an equally defensible view that Warsh is a dove when Republicans are in power and a hawk when there’s a Democrat in the White House. Back to Karma’s article:

The case against Warsh is this: What he wants seems to change depending on which party controls the White House. Warsh was a staunch inflation hawk during the Obama administration. Then Trump was elected, and he seemed to soften. In a 2018 Wall Street Journal op-ed titled “Fed Tightening? Not Now,” Warsh and his co-author, Stanley Druckenmiller, argued that, “given recent economic and market developments, the Fed should cease—for now—its double-barreled blitz of higher interest rates and tighter liquidity.”
“He’s someone who has repeatedly shown a willingness to change his positions on a dime when it’s politically convenient,” Skanda Amarnath, the executive director of Employ America, a Fed-focused think tank, told me.

Caveat two is that whatever his true views are, he’s very likely to come out of the box sending rate cut signals to the White House. Yes, that’s the antithesis of Fed independence and the polar opposite of what we’ve seen from Powell, someone who consistently speaks truth to power with clarity and strength. But my point here is that it will take some time to see where Warsh really stands.

There was another part of his testimony that I found highly concerning. He made a weird and troubling distinction between monetary policy, which he correctly argued should be independent from politics, and the Fed’s regulatory oversight role in banking and financial markets, which he incorrectly argued should be open to political pressures. This is a terrible idea, one that raises the risk of the White House pushing to let markets rip—what president doesn’t want a booming stock market?—and thereby underpricing the systemic risk that excessive financial deregulation never fails to deliver.

In a similar vein, Warsh, who made his $100+ million in markets, was also far too sympathetic to the idea of integrating cryptocurrencies into the banking system, a view that placates the powerful crypto lobby at the expense of ordinary Americans and the stability of the broader economy, given the riskiness and volatility of this asset class.

There were other ideas both bad—something about having the Fed work with the statistical agencies to derive a new inflation measure; that raises all sorts of potential conflicts, especially with Trump looming in the wings— or irrelevant—focusing on median or trimmed inflation measures, which of course the Fed staff already does—or good—dialing back excessive Fed communications, press conferences when there’s nothing much to say, and “dot plots” that get over-interpreted by obsessive Fed watchers.

All his stuff about how AI was going to raise the economy’s potential growth rate and thereby allow for lower rates was also misguided (and again, given my framework argued above, was just a tactic designed to please Trump and give his dovishness a penumbra of substance). First, all the capital equipment expenditures associated with AI investment will put upward pressure on rates (to be fair, I think he may have conceded that point) but more importantly, when it comes to productivity gains, you have to see them to believe them, and it takes at least five years to see them.

All told, as you see, I’m nervous about this guy as Fed chair, but he’s better than some of the alternatives, and I’m definitely going to give him a chance. I believe he’s capable of rising to the occasion and filling the shoes of some of the great chairs who came before him, but I’ll be watching closely. Most of what I heard yesterday was not inspiring in that regard.

Which brings me to my final point. These confirmation hearings are awful. They reveal nothing about the nominee except how good he or she is in bending themselves into a pretzel to avoid saying anything of substance (to be fair, there are exceptions; the Van Hollen example above was a smart, substantive question that Warsh flubbed). The members spend their time mostly signaling to their constituents that they’re either harassing or supporting the president’s picks, and then the votes proceed along partisan lines. There’s got to be a better way.

It would be better to have a hearing wherein D and R witnesses, excluding the nominee, discuss the nominees work and his/her positions. At least that way, the public could learn more about what the nominee really believes.

Anyway, much more to come on this, though only if Trump can get out of his own way and let Warsh move ahead.

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.
Inflation Irritation: Are Voters Still Enraged Because Trump Lied About Prices?

Inflation Irritation: Are Voters Still Enraged Because Trump Lied About Prices?

According to Donald Trump, the U.S. economy is doing great. We’re enjoying a huge boom, there’s no inflation, and we’re all getting tax cuts. We have prosperity like nobody has ever seen before.

But it’s probably not news to you that reality doesn’t agree. Inflation was stubbornly elevated even before the Iran debacle, while growth has been sluggish. Jobs for entry-level workers are hard to find while mortgage and car loan rates are up. Gas-pump prices are above $4 on average and around 10 million Americans are projected to lose health insurance by 2028. Yet the one economic variable that stands out, that really is like nothing anyone has ever seen before,is consumer confidence: The long-running University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment just hit its lowest point ever recorded.

And that’s a puzzle. Obviously, I’m no defender either of Trump’s policies or of his lies. But while the U.S. economy isn’t nearly as good as he claims, it’s objectively not bad enough to justify the worst consumer sentiment in history — worse than during the stagflation at the end of the 1970s, worse than in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

Warning: Today’s post is wonkier than usual, at least in tone. It basically ends with a question mark. My main goal today is to share a puzzle with readers and explain why I’m not satisfied with the answers smart people — especially two of my favorite data analysis gurus, Jared Bernstein and G. Elliott Morris — are offering. They argue that it’s all about the level of prices. While that is certainly an important factor, I believe that there is more to the story. I believe that the current extremely negative sentiment is a result of Americans’ correct sense that they have been lied to. To discuss this fully will take a couple of posts. So today I will introduce the puzzle and enlarge on the range of explanations in the next post.

Start with the puzzle: Why are Americans so down on an economy that, while not the greatest, isn’t terrible by the usual measures? This isn’t a new question: Kyla Scanlon coined the term “vibecession” in 2022 for a situation in which people feel bad about an economy that doesn’t look that bad by the numbers. But the puzzle has intensified over time, both because the bad feelings have gotten worse and because the vibecession has been so persistent.

Historically, consumer sentiment tracked objective measures of the state of the economy. In fact, you could predict sentiment fairly well using just one variable: the so-called “misery index,” the sum of inflation and the unemployment rate. Here, using annual averages (and the first three months of 2026) is what the relationship between the misery index and consumer sentiment has looked like since 1990:



You can get an even better fit to pre-Covid consumer sentiment by adding other economic variables, such as the performance of the stock market. But any way you cut it, since 2022 Americans have felt much worse about the economy than conventional economic measures say they “should.” Moreover, that pessimism has gotten worse over time: consumer sentiment is much worse now than it was in 2023 and 2024.

Many observers have attempted to explain these unusually bad feelings by claiming that the economy is worse than it looks, especially for working-class families. Going through those arguments would take me too far afield right now. But let me just say that some of those arguments, like claiming that ordinary workers didn’t share in the post-Covid recovery, are just wrong. Others, like pointing to much higher interest rates on mortgages and other loans, have validity. But they aren’t sufficient to explain why consumer sentiment is now worse than it was under stagflation and mass unemployment.

So what does explain the current dismal consumer sentiment? Both Bernstein and Morris argue that it’s about the price level as opposed to the rate of inflation.

The chart below illustrates what they mean. It shows the log of the Consumer Price Index since 2014. I use the log because this means that a given vertical distance always corresponds to the same percentage change, and the slope of the line shows the rate of inflation:

The U.S. experienced a bout of high inflation in 2021-22, largely because of disruptions to supply chains in the aftermath of Covid, plus fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This inflation spurt ended as supply chains became unsnarled and oil prices stabilized, and inflation since 2023 has been only modestly higher than it was pre-Covid. However, prices have never come back down and have remained persistently higher than the pre-2020 trend would have predicted.

And the story is that consumers aren’t fully mollified by the fact that inflation — the rate at which prices are rising — has slowed. They’re angry and upset that the level of prices remains much higher than they expected.

Both Bernstein and Morris find that if one adds a price-level variable to an equation predicting consumer sentiment, it tracks the data well. Morris concludes,

When it comes to how Americans feel about the economy today, whether you are measuring using objective structural price data or the polls, it’s the prices, stupid.

Why am I not fully convinced by this explanation? I have three questions:

First, does correlation imply causation? Consumer sentiment fell off a cliff after 2020. Also, prices surged after 2020. But lots of things changed with Covid. How sure are we that the second observation explains the first? Morris points to other survey data that support the prices to confidence link, but we’re still talking about basically one observation, which is always problematic.

Or to use a bit of jargon, is including the jump in prices in your equation just introducing a dummy variable? That is, is it simply a marker that something changed, but not a clear indication of what?

Second, shouldn’t this story have a sell-by date? The big price surge began five years ago. That’s a long time. Do you remember what groceries cost in April 2021? I don’t, not really. At some point one would expect people to recalibrate their expectations of what things “should” cost. Yet the vibecession is if anything deepening with the passage of time.

Third, what about Morning in America? Joe Biden presided over rapidly falling inflation for the second half of his term, yet received no credit because, we’re told, people were upset that prices hadn’t actually come down. But you know who else presided over falling inflation but a still-rising price level? Ronald Reagan. Here’s what happened to the overall level of consumer prices during Reagan’s first term and the Biden presidency:



The two presidents’ track records on prices were almost identical. Yet Reagan ran a triumphant reelection campaign on the theme that it was Morning in America, while the Biden economy was vilified. What was that about?

Jared is too good an economist to be unaware of this puzzle. He has shared with me a draft of a forthcoming paper with Daniel Posthumus, in which they do indeed find that the level of prices historically didn’t matter the way it seems to now. They suggest that the long era of relatively low inflation since the mid-1980s may have made people more sensitive to price shocks:

Our findings suggest that a huge storm after a long calm can be more upsetting to people who are not used to bad weather.

Indeed. But why has consumer sentiment gotten so much worse over the past year, even as the low prices people remember recede further into the past?

My speculative answer is that it has a lot to do with the lies of 2024. Remember, millions voted for Trump because he promised to reduce grocery prices “on Day One” and promised to cut energy bills in half. Now they know that they were had.

Paul Krugman is a Nobel Prize-winning economist and former professor at MIT and Princeton who now teaches at the City University of New York's Graduate Center. From 2000 to 2024, he wrote a column for The New York Times. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

Reprinted with permission from Paul Krugman.

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