Tag: inflation rate
Fresh Warnings In The Government's First-Quarter Economic Report

Fresh Warnings In The Government's First-Quarter Economic Report

There was a lot of news in the GDP report yesterday, in addition to the data from the day’s other releases. It took a little while to percolate, but here are my five major items:

1) GDP growth is worse than it looks;

2) Consumption is unbalanced and weak;

3) Inflation is worse than it looks;

4) The factory construction boom is going into reverse; and

5) There is no evidence of an AI productivity boom. (Our jobs are safe!)

I’ll deal with these in turn.

GDP Growth Was Driven by a Jump in Federal Government Spending

Spending by the federal government fell at a 16.6 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2025. This was partly driven by the DOGE layoffs, most of which first took effect in the fourth quarter. However, it was also partly driven by the government shutdown at the start of the quarter, which continued until the middle of November. The contraction from the DOGE cuts is not being reversed, but the contraction from the shutdown was reversed. This explains the 9.3 percent growth in federal spending, which added 0.56 percentage points (PP) to growth for the quarter.

Pulling out federal spending, GDP growth was around 1.5 percent. That’s not disastrous, but not something to write home about.

It is common for economists to look at the growth in final sales to domestic producers as a sort of “core” GDP. This strips out the growth (or shrinkage) from inventories and net exports.

This is an especially bad approach to the first quarter data. The big jump in federal spending gets counted in the core even though absolutely no one expects it to continue. (Actually, the Iran War may sustain growth in spending, but that is a bit out of the ordinary.) In the fourth quarter, the reduction in federal government spending reduced the growth rate by 1.16 PP, which was the main reason for the weak 0.5 percent growth rate reported for the quarter. The move to a core measure would not have changed that picture.

The other problem with the core measure is that the imports it strips out directly contribute to the investment growth it counts. Computer investment rose at a 64.7 percent annual rate, while investment in software increased at a 22.6 percent rate, contributing 0.58 PP and 0.51 PP, respectively, to the quarter’s growth. This is the data center boom.

However, many of the items being picked up by this growth are imported. If there is a comparable rise in investment in the second quarter, there will be a comparable increase in the trade deficit. It doesn’t make sense to count the positive but not the negative. The direct effect of imports is to grow other countries’ economies, not ours. (Yes, the indirect effect is positive, but that’s not the question here.)

Consumption Growth Was Driven by Healthcare Spending

Consumption grew at a 1.6 percent annual rate in the quarter, which is fine, even if on the slow side. But the troubling part is the composition. Healthcare spending accounted for 47 percent of the increase in consumption, while financial services accounted for another 24 percent, leaving less than 30 percent for everything else.

Durable goods consumption was barely positive. It was only kept above zero by a surge in March car purchases, possibly by people trying to get ahead of price increases. Non-durable goods consumption actually fell slightly.

The pattern here is that most areas where consumption might be seen as discretionary, like recreational vehicles, hotels, and restaurants, had declines in real spending. That is not a good story.

The Jump in Inflation was Not Just Driven by the War

We all know that the shutting of the Strait of Hormuz sent oil and gas prices soaring. This is a big factor in first quarter inflation, but far from the whole story.

Inflation was picking up even before the start of the war. The PCE deflator rose 0.3 percent in January and 0.4 percent in February. The core deflator rose 0.4 percent in both months. This pace is far above the Fed’s 2.0 percenttarget. March was considerably worse, with the overall rate rising 0.7 percent for the month. The annual rate for the quarter as a whole was 4.5 percent, the highest since the third quarter of 2022.

If the war ends quickly and the Strait is reopened, oil and gas prices will head back down, but according to the analyses I have seen, it will take much longer going down than going up. And many of the negative effects from the closing, like the shortage of fertilizer for planting, won’t be seen for months down the road.

It is also important to note that the data center boom is causing considerable inflation in other areas. The annual rate of inflation in computers and related equipment was 18.5 percent in the first quarter. This is likely to increase if the AI bubble continues to grow.

Factory Construction is Going Down Fast

There was an unprecedented boom in factory construction in the recovery from the pandemic. At its peak in 2024, real construction was going on at more than twice the pre-pandemic pace.

This has gone in reverse, and the decline is accelerating. Factory construction fell at a 22.7 percent rate in the quarter and is now down 21.7 percent from its peak in the third quarter of 2024. At the first quarter pace, we will be back to the pre-pandemic rate of factory construction in a year and a half.

No Evidence of an AI-Driven Productivity Boom

While the media are filled with stories about AI taking all the jobs, the data apparently have not gotten the message yet. Value-added in the non-farm business sector, where productivity is best measured, grew at a 1.5 percent annual rate. It looks as though hours will be close to flat for the quarter, although data revisions could change this story.

That would imply a 1.5 percent rate of productivity growth. That’s not a bad rate, but it’s down some from last year’s 2.5 percent. Everyone should know that the quarterly productivity data are highly erratic and subject to large revisions, but it’s safe to say that AI does not seem to be taking all the jobs just yet. Maybe we will have a different story next quarter.

War Is the Big Uncertainty

The economy was not looking great going into the war. To be clear, we were not looking at a recession or runaway inflation, but we were seeing weak growth, modest real wage growth, and at least moderately accelerating inflation. The war is making the inflation picture worse, and the longer it goes on, the worse the picture gets.

The additional military spending will provide a boost to growth, but it is not the sort of boost that anyone would want, other than military contractors. A quick peace deal will lessen the damage but will not make it all go away.

Dean Baker is a senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and the author of the 2016 book Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.

Fed Chair Confirmation Hearing Raises Grave Concerns About Nominee Kevin Warsh

Fed Chair Confirmation Hearing Raises Grave Concerns About Nominee Kevin Warsh

Kevin Warsh had his confirmation hearing yesterday to chair the Federal Reserve once current chair Jerome Powell’s term ends in mid-May. I’ve got a few choice words for these confirmation hearings in general, as they’ve become a big waste of time and should either be scrapped or somehow reformed. They’ve devolved into a signaling exercise that has almost nothing to do with the substance of the nominee’s work. And I speak from experience, as I had to go through a Senate confirmation (wherein I prevailed by 50-49 baby, i.e., with room to spare!).

In that light, I couldn’t watch much of this one. Too painful. But I closely followed it and can report on what I think we might be getting, once the Tillis hold is resolved (you can read about that here) and Warsh takes the chair (once he’s out of committee, he’ll get a majority in the Senate).

Between his opening statement and back-and-forth with the senators on the Banking Committee, I listened carefully to try to discern two things. First, and most important, Warsh’s independence from Trump, and second, what sort of monetary policy he might favor. In both cases, the signals were highly jammed by the posturing and shape-shifting that has made these confirmations largely futile exercises.

For one, Warsh really wants this job—he’s not alone in that—and he knows Trump is listening to him. He therefore has three choices: speak truth to power, Trump’s wrath be damned; mush it up so no one knows what he’s saying; just tell Trump what he wants to hear.

He largely chose the third path. This was no profile in courage. He wouldn’t say that Trump lost the 2020 election. He would not support either Lisa Cook or Powell against Trump’s attacks. More tellingly and substantively, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) challenged Warsh on the case for Fed rate cuts, given the fact that inflation has been above the Fed’s target for five years, and that was before war-induced price pressures. His line of questioning asked if a Federal funds rate of one percent would be too low right now, which should be an easy softball as even Trump’s appointee Fed Gov. Stephen Miran is not suggesting such an aggressive cut. But Warsh refused to admit that given current inflationary pressures, one percent would be too low a rate.

This is all concerning in terms of independence from Trump, and in normal circumstances would disqualify him. But anyone in that seat is in a vise, and it doesn’t make sense for them to accept the nomination and antagonize Trump. By showing up, Warsh is basically saying “I’m going to say pleasing things to Trump in order to get the job. They may or may not be true.” In fact, I think they’re mostly not true—my call from a while back that he’s a monetary hawk imitating a dove is looking good after this hearing, but we’ll get to that.

Bottom line, based on this performance, we must be nervous about Fed independence under Warsh, as would be the case with any Trump nominee. He’s shown himself to be a politically motivated shape-shifter, which makes it hard to know how he’d actually handle the independence question. It’s analogous to those Supreme Court justice confirmations wherein they invariably say, “don’t worry—I’m just there to call balls and strikes” and then, in many cases, implement a strike zone that’s more ideological than balanced.

Turning to how he’d govern, even as he sold himself as a rate-cutting dove, I saw numerous signs to the contrary. Before I get to them however, read this Atlantic take from Roge Karma back in January. Here’s how I weighed in:

…Warsh is seen as an inflation hawk who will err on the side of higher, not lower, interest rates. During the 2010s, he became known within Wall Street and Washington circles as one of the fiercest critics of the Fed’s zero-interest-rate policy, to the point of warning about inflation when unemployment was still at 10 percent. “He’s a pretty stone-cold hard-money guy,” Jared Bernstein, who served as the chair of Joe Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers, told me. “It’s a peculiar choice for Trump, because the Fed that Warsh wants is very different from the one Trump wants.”

If you listen carefully to both what Warsh said and, more tellingly, didn’t say, you can see what I mean. His opening statement mentions the full employment side of the Fed’s mandate once in passing, focusing far more intensely on the inflation side:

…Congress tasked the Fed with the mission to ensure price stability, without excuse or equivocation, argument or anguish. Inflation is a choice, and the Fed must take responsibility for it. Low inflation is the Fed’s plot armor, its vital protection again slings and arrows. So, when inflation surges—as it has done in recent years—grievous harm is done to our citizens, especially to the least well-off. They lose purchasing power. Their standard of living falls. They may also lose faith in our system of economic governance, raising doubts whether monetary policy independence is all it’s cracked up to be.

Such passion! Such concern for the poor! And he’s not wrong about the damage from high inflation (though the “inflation is a choice” part is off—exogenous supply shocks happen). But, replace the word “inflation” with “unemployment” and “purchasing power” with income. You can and should listen for yourself—here’s the full video—but I saw and heard a hawk in dove’s clothing.

If so, his internal weighting of the two sides of the mandate would be different from that of Powell, Yellen, Bernanke, who all seemed pretty balanced to me, though of course, pre-pandemic, inflation tended to run below target so the low correlation between unemployment and inflation (flat Phillips Curve) gave them more leeway to pursue lower unemployment.

Two caveats re this hawkish contention of mine. First, there is an equally defensible view that Warsh is a dove when Republicans are in power and a hawk when there’s a Democrat in the White House. Back to Karma’s article:

The case against Warsh is this: What he wants seems to change depending on which party controls the White House. Warsh was a staunch inflation hawk during the Obama administration. Then Trump was elected, and he seemed to soften. In a 2018 Wall Street Journal op-ed titled “Fed Tightening? Not Now,” Warsh and his co-author, Stanley Druckenmiller, argued that, “given recent economic and market developments, the Fed should cease—for now—its double-barreled blitz of higher interest rates and tighter liquidity.”
“He’s someone who has repeatedly shown a willingness to change his positions on a dime when it’s politically convenient,” Skanda Amarnath, the executive director of Employ America, a Fed-focused think tank, told me.

Caveat two is that whatever his true views are, he’s very likely to come out of the box sending rate cut signals to the White House. Yes, that’s the antithesis of Fed independence and the polar opposite of what we’ve seen from Powell, someone who consistently speaks truth to power with clarity and strength. But my point here is that it will take some time to see where Warsh really stands.

There was another part of his testimony that I found highly concerning. He made a weird and troubling distinction between monetary policy, which he correctly argued should be independent from politics, and the Fed’s regulatory oversight role in banking and financial markets, which he incorrectly argued should be open to political pressures. This is a terrible idea, one that raises the risk of the White House pushing to let markets rip—what president doesn’t want a booming stock market?—and thereby underpricing the systemic risk that excessive financial deregulation never fails to deliver.

In a similar vein, Warsh, who made his $100+ million in markets, was also far too sympathetic to the idea of integrating cryptocurrencies into the banking system, a view that placates the powerful crypto lobby at the expense of ordinary Americans and the stability of the broader economy, given the riskiness and volatility of this asset class.

There were other ideas both bad—something about having the Fed work with the statistical agencies to derive a new inflation measure; that raises all sorts of potential conflicts, especially with Trump looming in the wings— or irrelevant—focusing on median or trimmed inflation measures, which of course the Fed staff already does—or good—dialing back excessive Fed communications, press conferences when there’s nothing much to say, and “dot plots” that get over-interpreted by obsessive Fed watchers.

All his stuff about how AI was going to raise the economy’s potential growth rate and thereby allow for lower rates was also misguided (and again, given my framework argued above, was just a tactic designed to please Trump and give his dovishness a penumbra of substance). First, all the capital equipment expenditures associated with AI investment will put upward pressure on rates (to be fair, I think he may have conceded that point) but more importantly, when it comes to productivity gains, you have to see them to believe them, and it takes at least five years to see them.

All told, as you see, I’m nervous about this guy as Fed chair, but he’s better than some of the alternatives, and I’m definitely going to give him a chance. I believe he’s capable of rising to the occasion and filling the shoes of some of the great chairs who came before him, but I’ll be watching closely. Most of what I heard yesterday was not inspiring in that regard.

Which brings me to my final point. These confirmation hearings are awful. They reveal nothing about the nominee except how good he or she is in bending themselves into a pretzel to avoid saying anything of substance (to be fair, there are exceptions; the Van Hollen example above was a smart, substantive question that Warsh flubbed). The members spend their time mostly signaling to their constituents that they’re either harassing or supporting the president’s picks, and then the votes proceed along partisan lines. There’s got to be a better way.

It would be better to have a hearing wherein D and R witnesses, excluding the nominee, discuss the nominees work and his/her positions. At least that way, the public could learn more about what the nominee really believes.

Anyway, much more to come on this, though only if Trump can get out of his own way and let Warsh move ahead.

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.
Cyclical Or Structural? Figuring Whether The World Is Stuck With Higher Inflation

Cyclical Or Structural? Figuring Whether The World Is Stuck With Higher Inflation

While everyone’s fishing with clickbait these days—it’s an e-jungle out there—the highly experienced economic journalist Neil Irwin doesn’t make bold claims without some backup. So, when I read this Axios headline from him on Monday, I said “hmmmmm.” I stroked the chin. I furrowed the brow. I asked myself, “is that right?” I answered, “it could be!”

I mean, the economic problem of the decade is surely what Trump is in the process of doing to global economics, but where I go with Neil’s assertion, as you’ll read below, is more about whether something structural (vs. cyclical, as in the business cycle) has changed in how inflation is generated in the U.S. and other advanced economies. In fact, there’s an interesting new Fed Note on the topic which I’ll also highlight below. Like I said, my read of the evidence is maybe (re upward, structural change) but the fact that inflation’s been buffeted by a series of identifiable shocks means that it still may settle back into something closer to its pre-pandemic pattern.

Lurking behind this is the observation that the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, the PCE, has been above its 2% target since April of 2021, as in five years ago. I show the core PCE in the figure below, taking out energy/food spikes that the central bank can’t do much about. That persistent miss has gotta mean something, right?

A simple but not-too-far-off read of the figure above is that policymakers lost control of inflation in the 70s, Volcker lowered the boom, other inflationary forces, like oil shocks and wage-escalation clauses, became less common, and the central bank went in on “anchoring inflationary expectations,” i.e., convincing price setters it would do what it takes with its monetary policy tools to keep inflation around its 2% target.

But what then explains the not-the-70s-but-still-highly-noticeable rise at the end of the above series?

While it’s true that we’re less exposed to oil shocks, we’re clearly not immune, and we’ve had two in recent years, one of which is a big own-goal-kick by the Trump admin, in which we’re still ensconced. The other was Putin’s doing. (If you want to pause here and think about the causal linkages between authoritarian leaders and higher inflation, be my guest.) The figure shows the retail gas and oil prices (both indexed to 2019) on the left axis, and CPI yearly inflation on the right (the last data point there is the 3.3% March rate we learned of last week).

This is Neil’s piling-on point re supply shocks. Of course, the pandemic is on that list, which was a supply shock in many dimensions. Locked in by COVID, consumer preferences shifted sharply away from services and towards manufactured goods (see figure below), right at the time supply-chains were snarled, sending goods prices through the roof (I’m giving a talk this week on all this stuff, which is why I’m shoving all these slides down your throat).1

Next, enter the Orange Menace with a spate of supply shocks of his own. His and Stephen Miller’s anti-immigration actions have combined with aging boomers to take the growth of labor supply down to a drip. And again, his war is the latest supply shock, one that I do not believe will disappear anytime soon, regardless of the resolution of the ongoing negotiations.

On the demand side, I’d add Trump and Republicans' deficit-financed budget. The fact that historically large deficits stimulate the economy in both bad times (as they should) and good times (as they shouldn’t) doesn’t help in this regard.

Pushing the other way is the fact that productivity has accelerated over these very same five years, from about 1.5 percent to 2 percent—a big deal if it sticks—with potential further productivity juice to come from AI. This is a positive supply shock, typically associated with lower inflationary pressures. But that just means that half-mountain (or maybe just a foothill for now) at the end of the cumulative figure above would be steeper without this force pushing the other way.

I mentioned this Fed Note that asks: “Is the Inflation Process in Advanced Economies Different After the Pandemic?” It’s a quite clear and intuitive exposition; if all this interests you, give it a read. But here’s one of its key findings:

Each bar represents the share of components within the inflation indices of the different countries that are rising >3 percent (pretty fast), 0-3 percent (pretty normal), <0 percent (deflation). As you see, more market-basket components are growing faster, and especially in the US and UK, there’s less deflation (third panel).

Case closed, right? Nope. Tariff-induced goods inflation is in play in the U.S. and housing prices, which are heavily weighted in our data, were also on a tear but have recently eased. It’s an excellent note, but it doesn’t allow us to yet conclude that we’re in a new world re higher, stickier inflation versus we’re slowly getting back to something resembling pre-pandemic inflation dynamics.

Okay, that’s a lot of data points. What does it all mean? Here’s my take:

—Inflation has been elevated since the pandemic and is currently stuck well above the Fed’s target.

—But there are bespoke reasons for that: the spate of shocks and ongoing political-economy malpractice.

—That fact means we cannot conclude that something has changed in the economy’s inflation-generation function. For what it's worth, market-based expectations of where inflation is headed are only a bit elevated.

—But we should all be worried about this. It wouldn’t be terrible if inflation settled in at ~3% instead of ~2%, assuming real wages kept up. But if, instead, the businesses, investors, and employers that set the prices of goods, services, labor, and assets think inflation is on a roll, there’s a risk of de-anchoring expectations.

In that case, the little (half-)mountain/foothill above at the end of the cumulative slide could start to look uncomfortably like the bigger 70’s mountain.

Finally, as far as American humans are concerned, as I’ve argued ad nauseum, it’s not so much inflation—the rate of price changes—that’s gotten deeply under their skin. It’s the elevated price levels, which only grow higher whether inflation is at its two percent target or elevated due to shocks or structural shifts. That said, let’s not over-torque on this blazingly insightful insight of mine (that’s self-directed snark, to be clear; “people don’t like high prices” ain’t exactly the stuff of Nobel prizes). Faster inflation pushes the price level up faster, and, as we can observe in real time, that’s pushing our econ vibes from bad to worse.

[1There’s a different interpretation of this that is compelling: it’s not that supply chains broke; it’s that this demand shift required an almost immediate widening of the pipe through which goods flow, and that didn’t happen.]

Jared Bernstein is a former chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Joe Biden. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Budget and Policy Priorities. Please consider subscribing to his Substack.




Late Night Exposes Trump's Mad Tariff Plan As Mainstream Outlets Fail

Late Night Exposes Trump's Mad Tariff Plan As Mainstream Outlets Fail

A week after Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump proposed restricting food imports when asked how he’d lower the cost of food and groceries, many major newspapers, newswires, and broadcast news programs continue to ignore his proposal, which would lead to higher food prices for American consumers. And while broadcast news programs failed to report on the question and Trump’s long, rambling response, NBC late night host Seth Meyers and CBS late night host Stephen Colbert both highlighted Trump’s incoherence.

During a September 17 town hall in Flint, Michigan, an audience member asked Trump how he would “bring down the cost of food and groceries.” After Trump rambled about unrelated energy prices and Federal Reserve interest rates, he responded:

“We gotta work with our farmers. Our farmers are being decimated right now. They’re being absolutely, absolutely decimated. And you know, one of the reasons is we allow a lot of farm product into our country. We’re gonna have to be a little bit like other countries. We’re not gonna allow so much come — we’re gonna let our farmers go to work.”

Media Matters noted previously that several economists explained that Trump’s proposal would raise food prices, not lower them.

Some national news outlets, including Axios, noted that “Trump’s vow to lower grocery costs will backfire,” and writing in The Atlantic, the Cato Institute’s Scott Lincicome and Sophia Bagley described the folly of “Trump’s deranged plan to lower food prices by raising them.” MSNBC prime-time host Chris Hayes also mentioned Trump’s response to the food price question.

But many of the most prominent and influential major news organizations in the country failed to cover Trump’s comments at all.

Factiva searches turned up no coverage at all from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Associated Press, and Reuters between September 17 and noon on September 24.

A SnapStream search of the same time frame also turned up no coverage from the broadcast morning and evening news programming of ABC, CBS, NBC, and PBS, along with the corporate networks’ Sunday political talk shows.

Instead, CBS’ Evening News and PBS' NewsHour covered Trump’s farming-focused September 23 event in Pennsylvania, during which he threatened farm equipment manufacturer John Deere with 200% tariffs.

NBC’s Nightly News and Today covered Trump’s prearranged visit to a Pennsylvania grocery store the same day, where he gave $100 to a potential voter as a campaign stunt (a possible federal crime).

And The Associated Press reported on both September 23 events. These reports, however, failed to mention Trump’s incoherent answer on food prices from the previous week, even though he specifically mentioned that he would restrict imports of “farm product.”

Meanwhile, two of these networks’ late night comedy shows did cover his rambling response.

Both NBC’s Late Night with Seth Meyers and CBS’ Late Night with Stephen Colbert drew attention to the incoherent nature of Trump attempting, and failing, to explain how he would lower food prices, while their networks’ news programs ignored it.

Seth Meyers even helpfully contextualized the actual reason that grocery prices spiked in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting both the incoherence of Trump's rambling response and the ease with which a news network could have informed its viewers about the topic.

Methodology

Media Matters searched print articles in the Factiva database from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Associated Press, and Reuters for any of the terms “Trump,” “former president,” “nominee,” or “candidate” within the same headline or paragraphs as any of the terms “food,” “energy,” “interest” or “rate” or any variation of either of the terms “grocery” or “farmer” from September 17, 2024, when GOP presidential nominee Donald Trump answered a question about how he would lower food prices during a Michigan town hall, through noon on September 24, 2024.

We also searched transcripts in the SnapStream video database for all original episodes of ABC's Good Morning America, World News Tonight, and This Week; CBS' Mornings, Evening News, and Face the Nation; NBC's Today, Nightly News, and Meet the Press; and PBS’ NewsHour for for any of the terms “Trump,” “former president,” “nominee,” or “candidate” within close proximity of any of the terms “food,” “energy,” “interest” or “rate” or any variation of either of the terms “grocery” or “farmer” from September 17, 2024, through noon on September 24, 2024.

We included articles, which we defined as instances when Trump’s comments responding to a question about lowering the cost of food were mentioned in the headline or lead paragraphs in any section of the newspaper or newswire.

We also included segments, which we defined as instances when Trump’s comments responding to a question about lowering the cost of food were the stated topic of discussion or when we found significant discussion of the comments. We defined significant discussion as instances when two or more speakers in a multitopic segment discussed the comments with one another.

Reprinted with permission from Media Matters.

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